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THE NEW NEGLIGENCE STANDARD FOR SHIPOWNERS
AND LONGSHOREMEN-Scindia Steam Navigation
Co. v. De Los Santos
INTRODUCTION
In Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos,' the United
States Supreme Court addressed the question of which standard of
negligence applies to actions brought under section 905(b) of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.2 Under
section 905(b), a longshoreman may bring an action against the
shipowner if the longshoreman's injury is proximately caused by
the negligence of the shipowner.$ Because Congress failed to define
negligence under this section of the Act, much controversy has
arisen in the lower courts over which standard of negligence should
apply to longshoremen's actions.' In Scindia, the Supreme Court
adopted the "reasonable care under the circumstances" standard.
This article will briefly describe the state of the law prior to
Scindia. Next, the Scindia decision will be examined followed by
an analysis of the standard adopted by the Court. Finally, the im-
1. 101 S. Ct. 1614 (1981). This article will refer to the Supreme Court's opinion as
Scindia and to the Ninth Circuit's opinion as Santos. Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation
Co., 598 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1979).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976).
3. Section 905(b) provides in pertinent part:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negli-
gence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover dam-
ages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in
accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer shall
not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agree-
ments or warranties to the contrary shall be void .... The liability of the vessel
under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a
breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this sub-
section shall be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel except remedies
available under this chapter.
33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
4. See notes 29-42 infra and accompanying text.
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pact of the decision on longshoremen's actions brought under sec-
tion 905(b) will be discussed.
BACKGROUND
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA) is the workers' compensation act of the longshoring in-
dustry.5 The Act was amended in 1972,6 significantly affecting lia-
bility among shipowners," stevedores,8 and longshoremen. 9 Prior to
the amendments, an injured longshoreman, in addition to collect-
ing compensation benefits from his employer, could also sue the
shipowner alleging unseaworthiness and negligence.10 The ship-
owner could subsequently sue for indemnity the stevedore com-
pany that employed the longshoreman." Under the amendments,
5. The original act was passed by Congress in 1927. Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 69-803, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (current version at 33
U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976)). Congress had not acted prior to this time, since it expected long-
shoremen to be covered by the workers' compensation statutes of the states where they were
employed. The Supreme Court found this approach to be unconstitutional in Southern Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). The Court determined that stevedoring was essentially a
maritime matter within the federal admiralty jurisdiction. Congress, therefore, subsequently
provided longshoremen with a national workers' compensation scheme by means of the 1927
Act. For a detailed discussion of the history of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act (LHWCA) see Note, Developing a Consistent Theory of Vessel Liability
to Injured Longshoremen Under the LHWCA, 45 BROOKLYN L. Ray. 731, 733-34 (1979).
6. Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, Pub. L.
No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1263 (1972) (amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970)).
7. The terms "shipowner" and "vessel" will be used interchangeably in this article, since
§ 902 defines "vessel" as:
Any vessel upon which or in connection with which any person entitled to benefits
under this chapter suffers injury or death arising out of or in the course of his
employment, and said vessel's owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, charger
or bare boat charterer, master, officer, or crew member.
33 U.S.C. § 902(21) (1976).
8. Although the term "stevedore" is sometimes used to refer to workers who load or
unload cargo, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1268 (5th ed. 1979), throughout this article "steve-
dore" will refer to the longshoreman's employer.
9. The term "longshoreman" as used in this article will refer to those parties entitled to
recover damages under the Act. It should be noted that certain workers not engaged in
longshoring operations, including harborworkers, ship repairmen, shipbuilders, and ship
breakers, are entitled to recover for injuries. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1976).
10. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
11. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). The Court in
this case determined that by contractually undertaking to stow the cargo in a reasonably
safe manner, the stevedore warrants its services to the shipowner. A breach of this warranty
may give rise to a claim for indemnification.
For a discussion of Ryan, Sieracki, and other Supreme Court holdings that induced Con-
gress to pass the 1972 amendments, see Steinberg, The 1972 Amendments to the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: Negligence Actions by Longshoremen
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the amount of compensation paid to an injured longshoreman by
his employer, the stevedore company, was increased.12 The long-
shoreman's right to bring a strict liability action for unseaworthi-
ness against the shipowner was revoked, however, making the only
available action against the shipowner one for negligence which re-
quires a showing of actual or constructive knowledge.1 The
amendments also prohibit the shipowner from suing the stevedore
company for indemnity."
A primary concern of Congress in amending the LHWCA was
the improvement of safety conditions in the longshoring industry.1"
Congress attempted to meet this goal in two ways. First, it placed
primary responsibility for safe working conditions on the stevedore
company. Congress reasoned that the stevedore company was in
Against Shipowners-A Proposed Solution, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 767, 770-713 (1976).
12. The amendments provide that the longshoreman receives a percentage of the na-
tional average weekly wage rather than the maximum $70.00 per week allowed under the old
law. 33 U.S.C. § 906(b)(1) (1976). "The term 'national average weekly wage' means the na-
tional average weekly earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers on private non-agri-
cultural payrolls." 33 U.S.C. § 902(19) (1976).
13. "The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the war-
ranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. The remedy
provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel." 33
U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
The difference between unseaworthiness and negligence has been described as follows:
The former, analogous to a warranty concept, premised a shipowner's liability on
the presence of a defective condition in his vessel or any part thereof, which ren-
dered it unfit for the purposes for which it was to be used. Once such a defective
condition was found, a shipowner was cast in damages for injuries proximately
caused by the condition of the ship, without regard to traditional negligence con-
cepts of fault or due care. Thus, an injured longshoreman, having demonstrated
the presence of a defective condition, recovered on a theory of strict liability.
Zielinski v. Companhia de Navegacao Maritima Netumar, 460 F. Supp. 1179, 1182 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). Unseaworthiness and negligence are related in that the same defective condition can
give rise to a finding of both negligence and unseaworthiness. Id. See also G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-57 at 452 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE &
BLACK].
14. "[Tjhe employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indi-
rectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void." 33 U.S.C. § 905(b)
(1976).
15. H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4699 [hereinafter referred to as HOUSE REPORT]. See also Hazen & Toriello, Long-
shoremen's Personal Injury Actions Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 10 (1978) [hereinafter
referred to as Hazen & Toriello].
The longshoring industry has an unusually high accident rate. The injury frequency rate
was well over four times the average for manufacturing operations at the time the amend-
ments were passed. Theis, Amended Section Five of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act, 41 TENN. L. REV. 773, 773 n. 1 and accompanying text (1974).
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the best position to ensure the longshoreman's safety. 6 Second, to
cover the situation where neither the stevedore company nor the
longshoreman was solely at fault in causing the injury, Congress
provided in section 905(b) that the shipowner would be liable if its
negligence contributed to a longshoreman's injury, thereby encour-
aging the shipowner to assist in the prevention of accidents.
17
Concerning third party, damage actions, section 905(b) was in-
tended to place a worker injured on a ship in the same position as
a non-maritime employee injured on shore.' 8 Generally, a non-mar-
itime employee injured on the job may bring an action against a
third party for negligence if the third party's negligence is a proxi-
mate cause of the injury. ' But Congress failed to define negligence
under section 905(b). The legislators did specify, however, that the
negligence standard should be uniform and should be determined
as a matter of federal law.20 Congress envisioned a standard
modeled upon land-based standards of negligence, 2' but with cer-
tain maritime principles of law also applying. Specifically, these
maritime principles included comparative negligence rather than
contributory negligence, and the rule of admiralty that precludes
the defense of assumption of risk.22
16. HOUSE REPORT at 4699. See also Hazen & Toriello, supra note 15, at 8-10.
17. HOUSE REPORT at 4704. See also Hazen & Toriello, supra note 15, at 8-10.
18. House REPORT at 4703.
19. 2A A. LARSEN, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, §§ 71.00-71.10 (1976).
20. The House Report states:
[Tihe Committee does not intend that the negligence remedy authorized in the
bill shall be applied differently in different ports depending on the law of the
State in which the port may be located. The Committee intends that legal ques-
tions which may arise in actions brought under these provisions of the law shall be
determined as a matter of Federal Law.
HOUSE REPORT at 4705.
21. The House Report states:
The Committee intends that on the one hand an employee injured on board a
vessel shall be in no less favorable position vis a vis his rights against the vessel as
a third party than is an employee who is injured on land, and on the other hand,
that the vessel shall not be liable as a third party unless it is proven to have acted
I or failed to act in a negligent manner such as would render a land-based third
party in non-maritime pursuits liable under similar circumstances.
Id. at 4704.
22. The House Report states:
The admiralty concept of comparative negligence, rather than the common law
rule as to contributory negligence, shall apply in cases where the injured em-
ployee's own negligence may have contributed to causing the injury. Also, the
Committee intends that the admiralty rule which precludes the defense of "as-
sumption of risk" in an action by an injured employee shall also be applicable.
Id. at 4705.
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It is not surprising that, faced with these confusing and contra-
dictory statements in the legislative history, the courts had diffi-
culty in defining the applicable standard of negligence under sec-
tion 905(b). Commentators suggested various negligence standards.
One possibility was the standard applied to seamen under the
Jones Act,23 which requires a seaman to show the existence of a
duty, the negligent violation of that duty by the shipowner, and a
causal relationship between the shipowner's negligence and the
seaman's injury. The jury in such case may give a verdict for the
seaman if it finds that the shipowner's negligence played even a
slight part in bringing about the injury. 2' Another negligence stan-
dard considered2 5 was the general maritime standard of reasonable
care under the circumstances, as set forth in Kermarec v. Compa-
gnie Generale Transatlantique.s6 In Kermarec, the Supreme Court
held that "the owner of a ship in navigable waters owes to all who
are on board for purposes not inimical to his legitimate interests
the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of
each case."'27 Finally, application of the common law principles of
negligence as embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts was
suggested."'
Although the majority of courts faced with section 905(b) cases
applied the standards of the Restatement, these courts failed to
apply the same sections of the Restatement."' Some courts adopted
23. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). The Jones Act entitles an injured seaman to sue the ship-
owner based on the shipowner's negligence. For further discussion, see GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 13, §§ 6-20 to 6-37.
24. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 13, §§ 6-34 to 6-37, 6-57 at 453-55.
25. See Robertson, Negligence Actions by Longshoremen Against Shipowners Under
Section 905(b) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 3 MAR.
LAW. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Robertson).
26. 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
27. Id. at 632.
28. See Comment, Admiralty-Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act-Business Invitee Doctrine Used to Define Vessel's Standard of Care Under Section
905(b) of the 1972 Amendments. Ramirez v. Toko Kaiun K.K. 385 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Cal.
1974), 7 RUTGERs-CAMDEN L.J. 147 (1975); Comment, The Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act and the Invitee Standard: Maritime Law Gone Aground? 53
WASH. L. REv. 663 (1978).
29. See cases cited in notes 31-33 infra. For a discussion of these cases, see George, The
Content of the Negligence Action by Longshoremen Against Shipowners Under the 1972
Amendments to the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 11 J. MAR. L.
& Com. 1 (1979); Comment, Longshoremen's Actions Under the 1972 Amendments: An Al-
ternative to Cox and Canizzo-Cox v. Flota Merchante [sic] Grancolobiana [sic]; Canizzo
v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 4 MAR. LAW. 174 (1979).
19811
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sections 343 and 343A,30 believing that the shipowner's duty of
care is equivalent to that of a landowner, while the longshoreman's
position is comparable to that of an invitee.3 1 Those decisions held
that a shipowner was not required to warn of open and obvious
dangers unless it should have anticipated that an injury would oc-
cur to a longshoreman despite the obviousness of the danger. Other
courts applied section 409,32 which deals with independent con-
tractors.3 Under that section, the shipowner is considered the em-
ployer of an independent contractor, the stevedore company. The
shipowner is not liable for damage caused by the independent con-
tractor's employees, unless one of the specific exceptions to the
rule applies.
Besides the Restatement standard, the other approach most
often applied by the courts was the reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances standard of Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Trans-
atlantique.34 In Kermarec, a visitor on the ship suffered an injury
30. Section 343 provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees
by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of rea-
sonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will
not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
Section 343A states:
A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them
by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious, unless
the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 343, 343A (1965).
31. See, e.g., Evans v. Transportacion Maritime Mexicana SS "Campeche", 639 F.2d 848
(2d Cir. 1981); Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1978); Wiles v. Delta S.S.
Lines, Inc., 574 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1978); Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas,
573 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1978); Lubrano v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 572 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.
1978); Brown v. Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1977); Gay v. Ocean
Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977); Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners
Corp., 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976); Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, 536 F.2d 505 (2d'Cir. 1976);
Bovia v. S/S Agia Erini, 433 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. La. 1977); Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedl-
loyd B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Or. 1975); Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc.,
394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975); Birrer v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 386 F. Supp.
1105 (D. Or. 1974).
32. Section 409 provides: "[T]he employer of an independent contractor is not liable for
physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965).
33. Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861
(1977); cf. Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, 553 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1977).
For a discussion of Hurst and the independent contractor approach, see Comment, Ship-
owner's Duties and Apportionment of Liability Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 323, 338-341 (1978).
34. 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
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resulting from the defective operation of the ship's stairs.8" The
Court held that the shipowner owes a duty of reasonable care
under the circumstances.36 This holding was reaffirmed in Federal
Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co.,37 a suit in which
the stevedore company sought damages from the shipowner for
compensation benefits the stevedore company was required to pay
to the deceased longshoreman's dependents as a result of the ship-
owner's negligence. 8 The Court in Burnside held that federal law
imposes on the shipowner the duty to the stevedore company of
exercising reasonable care under the circumstances.8 '
The reasonable care under the circumstances approach became
popular among certain courts that had grown dissatisfied with the
application of the Restatement.40 This dissatisfaction was attribu-
table in part to the fact that the Restatement, particularly in sec-
tions 343 and 343A, incorporates both the defense of contributory
negligence and that of assumption of risk.41 This dissatisfaction
with the Restatement position led to the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Santos.42
THE DECISION: Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos
Factual Background
Plaintiff, Lauro de los Santos, was injured when he and other
longshoremen employed by thi Seattle Stevedoring Company were
loading sacks of wheat in the hold of a ship owned by the defen-
dant, Scindia. The longshoremen were using a winch,48 which was
35. Id. at 626.
36. Id. at 629-32.
37. 394 U.S. 404 (1969).
38. Id. at 409.
39. Id. at 414-18.
40. See, e.g., Rich v. United States Lines, Inc., 596 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1979); Brown v.
Ivarans Rederi A/S, 545 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977); Espinoza
v. United States Lines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen &
Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Teofilovich v. d'Amico Mediterranean/Pacific
Lines, 415 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
41. "Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484, 494 (N.D. Cal. 1977). For a
discussion of the conflict between the Restatement standard and congressional intent re-
garding the Restatement's incorporation of the assumption of risk defense, see Note, The
Injured Longshoreman v. The Shipowner After 1972: Business Invitees, Land-Based Stan-
dards, and Assumption of Risk, 28 HASTINGs L.J. 771 (1977).
42. Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 598 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1979). See Comment,
Section 905(b) and a Standard of Negligence: Cosmos or Chaos?, 4 MAR. LAw. 305 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Cosmos or Chaos?].
43. A winch is "any of various machines or instruments for hauling or pushing: as a
1981]
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part of the ship's gear, to lower pallets of wheat into the hold. Se-
attle Stevedoring controlled the loading procedure."
The winch had been malfunctioning for two days, and it was still
malfunctioning on the day of the accident. The braking mechanism
would occasionally slip, causing the load to fall freely for several
feet before coming to a stop. Just prior to the injury to plaintiff,
the pallet did not stop as it should have before striking a pallet
jack,4 5 although the winch operator had applied the brake. As a
result, a number of wheat sacks spilled."" After the winch driver
raised the pallet, the hatch tender, an employee of Seattle who was
directing the driver, determined that the sacks remaining on the
pallet would not fall. Santos, therefore, began clearing the spilled
sacks. Some wheat sacks did fall, however, striking Santos and
causing his injuries.47
The District Court's Decision
The district court granted summary judgment for the shipowner,
holding that land-based standards of negligence applied. 8 Under
such standards, a shipowner is not liable for dangerous conditions
created by the stevedore's negligence while the stevedore is in ex-
clusive control of the loading operations. Here the court found that
the defective winch was an open and obvious danger. The court
held that even if the shipowner knew or should have known that
the winch was defective, the shipowner was not liable as a matter
of law under sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement, since it
powerful machine having one or more barrels or drums on which to coil a rope, cable, or
chain for hauling or hoisting". WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DicONARY 2618-19
(1961).
44. 598 F.2d at 482.
45. "A pallet jack is a small, wheeled, cartlike vehicle with prongs on the front like a
forklift with which the longshoremen in the hold would cart the pallet load to the wings of
the hold where they would then remove the sacks and stow them by hand." 101 S. Ct. at
1618 n. 5.
46. 598 F.2d at 482.
47. Id. Several material facts of the case were in dispute. It is uncertain whether the
shipowner actually knew about the condition of the winch, whether the stevedore had exclu-
sive control over the gear and the premises, whether the first sacks were spilled due to the
pallet striking the pallet jack or because the winch failed to stop the pallet before it struck
the jack, and how the sacks fell which hit Santos. Id. at 489-91. Since the case was decided
on a motion for summary judgment in favor of the shipowner, the facts are presented in this
article in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. This was the approach taken by the court
of appeals. Id. at 482.
48. Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 1976 AMC 2583, 2584 (W.D. Wash.). The
district court's opinion is also found at Appendix A of the Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari,
Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 101 S. Ct. 1614 (1981).
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had no duty to warn the stevedore company or the stevedore's em-
ployees of open and obvious dangers.4'
The Ninth Circuit's Decision
The district court's decision was reversed and remanded by the
Ninth Circuit.50 The court of appeals determined that the correct
standard of negligence was not that set forth in sections 343 and
343A, but rather that of reasonable care under the circumstances. 51
It arrived at this standard after reviewing the congressional intent
behind the 1972 amendments and cited five specific concerns:
safety; assurance of uniformity by application of federal law; aboli-
tion of the unseaworthiness remedy for longshoremen; application
of comparative negligence rather than contributory negligence; and
elimination of the defense of assumption of risk." In light of these
concerns, the court adopted the following standard of negligence
under section 905(b):
A vessel is subject to liability for injuries to longshoremen work-
ing on or near the vessel caused by conditions on the vessel if, but
only if, the shipowner (a) knows of, or by the exercise of reasona-
ble care would discover, the condition, and should realize that it
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such longshoremen, and
(b) the shipowner fails to exercise reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances to protect the longshore&en against the danger."
The court gave three reasons for not following those circuits
which had adopted sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement as
the standard of negligence under section 905(b). First, it found
those sections inconsistent with congressional intent to apply the
doctrine of comparative negligence to these cases rather than the
doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk." Ac-
cording to the court, the Restatement sections further undermine
Congress's intention of creating economic incentives to promote
safer work conditions and reduce accidents. Second, the court cited
the Supreme Court's decision in Kermarec v. Compagnie General
49. 1976 AMC at 2586 (W.D. Wash.).
The court found in the alternative that the condition of the winch could not have been
the proximate cause of Santos's injury. Id. at 2587.
50. Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 598 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1979).
51. Id. at 486.
52. Id. at 484-85.
53. Id. at 485.
54. Id. at 486.
1981]
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Transatlantique" in support of its adoption of the reasonable care
under the circumstances approach. Third, the court stated that it
was not impinging on legislative policy by adopting this negligence
standard, because the Act's legislative history makes no reference
to the Restatement or to real property tort law terminology."
Following the decision of the court of appeals, one commentator
heralded the Santos standard as "an end to chaos. '5 7 Other courts,
however, reaffirmed their application of the Restatement negli-
gence standards to longshoremen's actions.58 For example, in Gui-
dry v. Continental Oil Co.,59 the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the
Santos standard, reviewed the facts of the case in light of that
standard, but applied and emphasized the Restatement standard."
In Evans v. Transportacibn Maritime Mexicana SS
"Campeche",61 the Second Circuit applied the Restatement stan-
dard and rejected the Ninth Circuit's contention that application
of sections 343 and 343A necessarily implies the availability of the
defenses of assumption of risk or contributory negligence.'
The Supreme Court's Decision
The Opinion of the Court
When the Ninth Circuit declined to rehear the case, the Su-
55. 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
56. 598 F.2d at 486-88.
57. Comment, Cosmos or Chaos?, supra note 42 at 316-21 (1979). See also George, The
Content of the Negligence Action by Longshoremen Against Shipowners Under the 1972
Amendments to the Longshoremen [sic) and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act-A Post-
script, 11 J. MaR. L. & CoM. 253, 256 (1980), where the author states that, "Santos repre-
sents a scholarly and persuasive analysis and interpretation of the applicable negligence
standard to be applied in 905(b) cases and should serve as an appropriate authority when
the Supreme Court ultimately decides the issue of the standard of negligence applicable in
905(b) cases."
58. See, e.g., Johnson v.' A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. dis-
missed, 101 S. Ct. 959 (1981); Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and remanded sub nom. American Commercial
Lines v. Griffith, 49 U.S.L.W. 3824 (1981); Lawson v. United States, 605 F.2d 448 (9th Cir.
1979); Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers, 605 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, judg-
ment vacated, and remanded, 49 U.S.L.W. 3863 (1981).
See also Sarauw v. Oceanic Navigation Corp., 622 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1980) (adopting
Santos by following Griffith); Ryder v. United States, 513 F. Supp. 551 (D. Mass. 1981)
(adopting Santos by applying the standard as stated in Johnson); Sea Quest Marine, Inc. v.
Cove Shipping, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 701 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (willing to apply the Santos stan-
dard but not having the opportunity because of a lack of evidence in the case).
59. 640 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1981).
60. Id. at 531-32.
61. 639 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1981).
62. Id. at 857 n. 10.
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preme Court granted certiorari due to the conflict among the cir-
cuits regarding the standard of care to be applied under section
905(b). 3 In a unanimous decision,64 the Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the court of appeals," and held that under Marine
Terminals v. Burnside Shipping Co." the vessel owes a duty to
the stevedore and longshoremen to exercise due care under the cir-
cumstances. According to Justice White, author of the Court's
opinion, this duty at least requires that the shipowner exercise or-
dinary care under the circumstances'when turning over the ship
and its equipment to the stevedore, and that the ship be in such
condition that the stevedore could carry on its cargo operations
with reasonable safety.67 This duty 'also requires that the ship-
owner warn a stevedore of any dangerous condition of the ship or
its equipment of which the shipowner knows or should know,
which the stevedore is likely to encounter in its operations, and
which is not likely to be obvious to or anticipated by the
stevedore."
The Court further stated that when the vessel is actively in-
volved in stevedoring operations and a longshoreman is injured
due to the vessel's negligence, the vessel may be held liable. Simi-
larly, if an area of the ship or its equipment remains in the control
of the shipowner during loading or unloading, and the shipowner
fails to exercise due care and exposes the longshoreman to danger,
the ship will be liable for any resulting injury to the
longshoreman.' 9
If the vessel does not actively take part in the stevedoring opera-
tions, then its duty is more limited. In contrast to the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the Supreme Court took the position that the vessel's duty to
the longshoreman requires neither inspection nor supervision of
the stevedore's operations.70 The Court believed that imposing a
continuing duty on the shipowner to.take reasonable steps to dis-
cover and correct dangerous conditions that develop during the
loading or unloading process would be inconsistent with the
63. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 446 U.S. 934 (1980).
64. Chief Justice Burger did not, however, participate in the decision. Scindia Steam
Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 101 S. Ct. 1614, 1628 (1981).
65.- Id.
66. 394 U.S. 404 (1969).
67. 101 S. Ct. at 1621.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1622.
70. Id.
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LHWCA. The Court reasoned that when Congress passed the 1972
amendments, Congress intended to end shipowner liability based
on the theory of unseaworthiness or nondelegable duty.7 1
The Court further held that the shipowner is entitled to rely on
the stevedore to avoid exposing its employees to unreasonable dan-
gers. The shipowner's reliance is warranted because an express
provision in the Act72 requires the stevedore to provide a reason-
ably safe place to work. This reliance is also appropriate because
the stevedore normally warrants to discharge its duties in a work-
man-like manner. The shipowner, therefore, has no duty to super-
vise or inspect the stevedore's operations absent contract provi-
sion, positive law, or custom to the contrary. 3
The Court next addressed the issue of the shipowner's duty
when both the vessel and the stevedore have knowledge of a dan-
gerous condition which exists or develops during the cargo opera-
tions. The Court held that, when danger to the longshoreman
arises because the ship's gear malfunctions, the shipowner's duty
to act depends on the circumstances. Although in this case the de-
cision to continue using the malfunctioning winch was a matter of
judgment for the stevedore, the Court suggested the possibility
that the stevedore's judgment was so obviously improvident that if
the shipowner knew of the winch's condition and its continued use,
the .shipowner should have realized the unreasonable risk it
presented to the longshoreman, and should have intervened to re-
pair it. The Court stated that a similar duty to intervene would
also arise where the defect existed from the outset. In that situa-
tion, the shipowner would be deemed to have been aware of the
condition.74
For purposes of determining if the shipowner had breached its
duty, the Court considered the legal duties of the stevedore and
71. Id. at 1622-23.
72. That section provides:
Every employer shall furnish and maintain employment and places of employ-
ment which shall be reasonably safe for his employees in all employments covered
by this chapter and shall install, furnish, maintain, and use such devices and safe-
guards with particular reference to equipment used by and working conditions
established by such employers as the Secretary [of Labor] may determine by regu-
lation or order to be reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, and safety of
such employees, and to render safe such employment and places of employment,
and to prevent injury to his employees.
33 U.S.C. § 914(a) (1976).
73. 101 S. Ct. at 1624.
74. Id. at 1624-26.
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the vessel's justifiable expectations that those duties will be per-
formed. The duties imposed on the vessel by statute, regulation, or
custom and the contract between the stevedore and the shipowner
were also held to be relevant."'
The Court reviewed the regulations dealing with the use of the
ship's gear by the stevedore and suggested that when a defective
winch is discovered it should be reported to and repaired by the
shipowner, not the stevedore. 6 If this standard is applied, then
several material facts, including the shipowner's knowledge, remain
in dispute. If a jury finds that the shipowner was aware that the
winch was defective after loading operations began, the shipowner
will be attributed with actual knowledge. If, however, the winch
was defective when the ship was turned over to the stevedore, a
finding of knowledge would also follow. Assuming the shipowner is
chargeable with knowledge, then the next material fact for resolu-
tion will be whether the stevedore's decision to proceed with cargo
operations was improvident. In this case, whether the winch was so
clearly unsafe that the shipowner should have stepped in and
halted the loading operation until the winch was repaired was a
determination for a jury. The case was, therefore, remanded to the
district court to be tried by a jury.77
The Concurring Opinions
Two concurring opinions were filed in which five of the jus-
tices joined. Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined with Justice
Brennan who expressed his views under the 1972 amendments."
75. Id. at 1626.
76. Id at 1626-27.
The relevant regulations as cited by the Court state: "Any component of cargo handling
gear . . . which is visibly unsafe shall not be.used until made safe." Safety and Health
Regulations for Longshoring, 29 C.F.R. § 1918.51(b) (1980). "Any defect or malfunction of
winches shall be reported immediately to the officer in charge of the vessel." 29 C.F.R. §
1918.53(a)(5). "When the electromagnetic or other service brake is unable to hold the load,
the winch shall not be used." 29 C.F.R. § 1918.53(c)(1). "Employees shall not be permitted
to tamper with or adjust electric control circuits." 29 C.F.R. § 1918.53(c)(2).
77. 101 S. Ct. at 1626-27.
78. Id. at 1628. All the concurring justices concurred both in the decision and in Justice
White's opinion.
79. Justice Brennan wrote:
(1) a shipowner has a general duty to exercise reasonable care under the circum-
stances; (2) in exercising reasonable care, the shipowner must take reasonable
steps to determine whether the ship's equipment is safe before turning that equip-
ment over to the stevedore; (3) the shipowner has a duty to inspect the equipment
turned over to the stevedore or to supervise the stevedore if a custom, contract
provision, law or regulation creates either of those duties; and (4) if the shipowner
1981]
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Justice Brennan's position is actually a consolidated listing of the
rules which the Court laid down in this decision.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion, joined by Justice Rehnquist,
emphasized the distinctions between the Supreme Court's ap-
proach and the Ninth Circuit's reasonableness standard. Justice
Powell noted that, under the Supreme Court's approach, the ship-
owner has no duty by way of supervision or inspection to exercise
reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions which arise
within the confines of the stevedore's operations,"0 whereas the
Ninth Circuit held that the shipowner owes a continuing duty to
inspect and supervise even if the ship is turned over to the steve-
dore in safe condition.8' Furthermore, according to Powell, under
the majority position the shipowner has only a limited duty re-
garding obvious dangers of which it has knowledge. Thus, the ship-
owner can rely on the stevedore to provide a safe workplace. The
shipowner's duty arises only when the judgment of the stevedore
to continue work in the face of dangerous conditions is "obviously
improvident." 82 The Ninth Circuit did not phrase its criteria in
terms of "obvious improvidence," but rather in terms of
"reasonableness." 83
Justice Powell referred to the standard adopted by the court of
appeals as a "more general reasonableness standard."" In his view,
the problem with that more general standard was its failure to deal
with the problems of allocating responsibility between the steve-
dore and the shipowner. He voiced the fear that a jury, applying
the general reasonableness standard, would in most cases find the
shipowner liable, even though it might have been "reasonable" for
the vessel to rely on the stevedore to prevent injury to the long-
shoreman. This result would be likely because the only question
presented to the jury is whether the shipowner's failure to take
action to prevent an injury due to an obvious danger was reasona-
has actual knowledge that equipment in the control of the stevedore is in an un-
safe condition, and a reasonable belief that the stevedore will not remedy that
condition, the shipowner has a duty either to halt the stevedoring operation, to
make the stevedore eliminate the unsafe condition, or to eliminate the unsafe con-
dition itself.
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
80. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
81. 598 F.2d 480.
82. 101 S. Ct. at 1628. (Powell, J., concurring).
83. 598 F.2d 480.
84. 101 S. Ct. at 1628. (Powell, J., concurring).
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ble, and not whether the shipowner's reliance was reasonable.85
ANALYSIS
As Justice Powell's statement implies, the standard adopted by
the Supreme Court is more specific than that of the court of ap-
peals. The Ninth Circuit's standard was viewed by other courts
and commentators as an approach which was less rigid than the
Restatement standard. Therefore, Shipowners were more likely to
be found liable under the Ninth Circuit's standard than when the
Restatement sections were applied." In Scindia, although the
Court adopted the reasonable care under the circumstances stan-
dard of the court of appeals, it modified that principle.
The Court attempted to formulate guidelines for judging both
the shipowner's actions as well as its omissions. The Court laid
down some general rules governing when the shipowner has a duty
to act, which rules can be delineated with reference to specific time
frames. Under the shipowner's limited duty as set forth in Scindia,
the ship and its equipment must be in a safe condition for the ste-
vedore's use before the stevedore comes aboard. When the steve-
85. Id. at 1628-29. (Powell, J., concurring).
86. After the 1972 amendments and prior to the Ninth Circuit's decison in Santos, the
majority of longshoremen's cases in which Restatement provisions were applied were de-
cided in favor of the shipowner. See, e.g., Cox v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577
F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 881 (1978); Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554
F.2d 1237 (3d Cir. 1977); Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th cir.
1977); Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976); Bess v.
Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1975); Slaughter v. S.S. Ronde Fyffes Group, Ltd., 509
F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'g 390 F. Supp. 637 (S.D. Ga. 1974); Smith v. B. P. Tanker Co.,
Ltd., 395 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F.
Supp. 413 (E.D. La. 1975); Ramirez v. Toko Kalun K.K., 385 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Cal. 1974);
Citizen v. MNV Triton, 384 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Fedison v. Vessel Wislica, 382 F.
Supp. 4 (E.D. La. 1974); Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 380 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Tex.
1974); Wood v. M/V Aristoteles, 1975 AMC 1057 (E.D. La. 1974); DeLoatch v. American
President Lines, 1975 AMC 674 (E.D. Va. 1974); White v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 1975 AMC
191 (D. Md. 1974).
The few decisions in which the plaintiff longshoreman prevailed prior to the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Santos include the following: Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978); Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas
Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1978); Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedloyd, B.V. Rijswijk,
398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Or. 1975); Hubbard v. Great Pacific Shipping Co., 1975 AMC 1518 (D.
Or. 1975); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 1975 AMC 1505 (D. Or. 1974). See
also Robertson, Negligence Actions by Longshoremen Against Shipowners Under the 1972
Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 7 J. MAR. L.
& CoM. 447, 453 (1976). Once the reasonable care standard was applied, the tide turned. In
each case where Santos was adopted the shipo~ner was found liable. See cases cited at note
58 supra.
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dore comes aboard, the shipowner must warn it of any hidden dan-
gers of which the shipowner knows or should know. During the
stevedoring operations, the shipowner has no duty to discover dan-
gerous conditions unless a contract provision, positive law, or cus-
tom provides otherwise. During the cargo operations, however, if
the shipowner receives notice of a defective condition, it may have
a duty to act.
The Scindia opinion fails to clearly articulate the last rule. The
Court refused to adopt the broad principle that a duty arises dur-
ing cargo operations in every circumstance where the shipowner
becomes aware of a dangerous condition. Although the Supreme
Court acknowledged the stance of the Second Circuit in Evans v.
Transportacion Maritime Mexicana SS "Campeche" 87 it did not
adopt that court's position."8 In Evans, the Second Circuit stated
that the shipowner has a duty to act if it anticipates or should
anticipate that the stevedore will not or cannot correct a dangerous
condition which arises during the cargo operations."9 In Scindia,
the Court limited its holding to the facts of the particular case
before it. Under those facts, it suggested that the stevedore's judg-
ment to continue the work despite the danger posed by the defec-
tive winch may have been so improvident that the shipowner
should have intervened and stopped the loading operation.9"
87. 639 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1981).
88. The Court stated:
We are presently unprepared to agree that the shipowner has precisely the duty
described by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, but for the reasons that
follow we agree that there are circumstances in which the shipowner has a duty to
act where the danger to the longshoreman arises from the malfunctioning of the
ship's gear being used in the cargo operations.
101 S. Ct. at 1626.
89. 639 F.2d at 856.
90. But see Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, where he did not limit himself to the
facts of the case, but stated a general rule that if the shipowner has a "reasonable belief that
the stevedore will not remedy that condition, the shipowner has a duty either to halt the
stevedoring operation, to make the stevedore eliminate the unsafe condition, or to eliminate
the unsafe condition itself." 101 S. Ct. at 1628. (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Powell also
stated a general rule in his concurring opinion. "Only where the judgment of the stevedore
is 'obviously improvident,' and this poor judgment either is known to the shipowner or rea-
sonably should be anticipated under the circumstances, does the shipowner have a duty to
intervene." Id. (citation omitted) (Powell, J., concurring). Note that nowhere in the opinions
is there any indication of what "reasonable belief" or "obviously improvident" means, ex-
cept for the reference to "customs and regulations allocating responsibility for particular
repairs." Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
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Reasonable Care Under the Circumstances
Although the decision offers little guidance for applying the
standard in future cases, the Court did set forth some limits as to
how "reasonable care under the circumstances" should be defined.
The Court indicated that the trier of fact should look to the legal
duties imposed upon the stevedore as well as to the vessel's justifi-
able expectation that those duties will be performed. Also relevant,
according to the Court, are the statutes, regulations, and customs
which place a continuing duty on the vessel to repair the ship's
equipment used by the stevedore.9 1 Finally, the Court stated that
the contract between the shipowner and the stevedore should also
be considered.9 2
The Restatement and Land-Based Principles
Although the Court in Scindia adopted the reasonable care
under the circumstances approach, it did not completely discard
land-based principles of tort law as set forth in the Restatement.
Justice White, writing for the Court, indicated that while the Re-
statement sections did not offer sure guidance for section 905(b)
cases, those provisions were not irrelevant.9 3 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Powell pointed out that he considered the Court's
opinion to be consistent with the application of the Restatement
standard. " These two references to land-based principles strongly
suggest that the Restatement provisions are pertinent in defining
the reasonable care under the circumstances standard. It is also
clear, however, that the Restatement sections alone will no longer
be determinative of cases decided under section 905(b).
The Scindia decision further clarifies that any vestiges of the
assumption of risk or contributory negligence defenses as incorpo-
rated in the Restatement are no longer applicable. This is exempli-
fied by Justice White's rejection of the shipowner's argument that
Santos should have refused to continue working when the winch
was obviously dangerous.9 5 Openness and obviousness of a danger
91. Id. at 1626.
92. Id. n. 23.
93. Id. at 1622 n. 14. Justice White did not elaborate on this point. His statement indi-
cates, however, that the relevancy of the Restatement sections is still an open question.
94. Justice Powell stated that the Restatement standard "is consistent with the plain
intent of Congress to impose the primary responsibility on the stevedore. Although it is
unnecessary in this case for the Court to adopt this standard fully, I do not understand our
opinion to be inconsistent with it." Id. at 1628 n. 1.
95. Justice White agreed with the court of appeals:
1981]
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may still be relevant, however, to the issue of whether the ship-
owner acted reasonably under the circumstances.
IMPACT OF Scindia
Five cases have been decided since Scindia providing the lower
courts with an opportunity to apply the standard adopted by the
Supreme Court." Those decisions indicate that the standard of
negligence under section 905(b) is still unclear. A review of the de-
cisions will illustrate this point.
Bush v. Sumitomo Bank and Trust Co.9 was a case in which the
facts were essentially the same as those in Scindia. The district
court, therefore, had no difficulty in applying the new standard. In
[Tihe shipowner may not defend on the ground that Santos should have refused
to continue working in face of an obviously dangerous winch which its employer,
Seattle, was continuing to use. The District Court erred in ruling otherwise, since
the defense of assumption of risk is unavailable in § 905(b) litigation.
Id. at 1626 n. 22.
96. Sarauw v. Oceanic Navigation Corp., 655 F.2d 526 (3d Cir. 1981); Turner v. Japan
Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981); Robertson v. Jeffboat, Inc., 651 F.2d 434 (6th Cir.
1981); Melanson v. Caribou Reefers, Ltd., No. 76-754-C (D. Mass. May 19, 1981); Bush v.
Sumitomo Bank & Trust Co., 513 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
In another case, Polk v. Valdoro Cia Naviera, S.A., No. 79-1728 (6th Cir. June 30, 1981),
the court of appeals discussed the Scindia standard, but could not apply it due to a lack of
credible evidence in the case. The court affirmed a judgment entered on a directed verdict
against the longshoreman.
In Wild v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Corp., 650 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1981), the court of appeals
remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of a motion for summary judg-
ment for the defendant shipowner in light of Scindia.
Several cases had petitioned for writs of certiorari during the time that Scindia was
before the Supreme Court. In the following cases the petitions for writ of certiorari were
granted, the judgments were vacated, and the cases were remanded to the courts of appeals
for further consideration in light of Scindia: Futo v. Lykes Bros., 619 F.2d 81 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and remanded, 49 U.S.L.W. 3824 (1981); Griffith v.
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, judgment va-
cated, and remanded, sub nom. American Commercial Lines v. Griffith, 49 U.S.L.W. 3824
(1981); Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers, Ltd., 605 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted,
judgment vacated, and remanded, 49 U.S.L.W. 3863 (1981); McCarthy v. Silver Bulk Ship-
ping, Ltd., 487 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Pa. 1980), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and re-
manded, 49 U.S.L.W. 3824 (1981).
Cases in which certiorari was denied include: Raymond v. I/S Caribia 626 F.2d 203 (1st
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3824 (1981); Irizarry v. Compania Maritime, No. 79-
7876 (2d Cir. May 22, 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3824 (1981); Matthews v. Ernst Russ
S.S. Co., 603 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3825 (1981); Clemons v.
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 596 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, sub nom. McCulley v.
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 49 U.S.L.W. 3824 (1981).
Other cases.were remanded to the district courts by the appellate courts after Scindia.
See, e.g., McCullough v. S.S. Coppename, 648 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1981); Roberts v. Andrew
Martin Sea Serv., Inc., 646 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1981).
97. 513 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
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Bush, the plaintiff was injured due to the malfunctioning of the
ship's crane used in the loading operations. The court found that
the shipowner was aware of the faulty condition, that the stevedore
should have ceased using the crane because it was unsafe, and that
the shipowner should have stopped the loading operation until the
crane was repaired.98 This case exemplifies what the Scindia deci-
sion referred to as an "obviously improvident" decision by the ste-
vedore.9 9 The stevedore decided to continue working in the face of
a danger, thus triggering a duty to intervene on the part of the
shipowner.
The other four cases present situations which differ factually
from Scindia. In Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd.100 and Melanson v.
Caribou Reefers, Ltd.,101 each plaintiff's injury was caused by a
condition of the ship's cargo. In Turner, the shipowner was held to
be liable, whereas in Melanson, it was not. In the latter case, the
longshoreman suffered a heart attack a month after lifting an un-
expectedly heavy load caused by two cartons sticking together. The
cartons were frozen, allegedly because the ship was negligently
loaded in rain and mist. A member of the ship's crew had even
attempted to pry some of the cartons free with a crowbar. Thus, it
was clear that not only was the shipowner aware of the condition,
but it also took an active part in the cargo operations. The court,
however, affirmed summary judgment for the shipowner on the
ground that under Scindia the shipowner owed no legal duty to
the longshoreman. This result followed because in the Melanson
court's view the stevedore's judgment was not "obviously improvi-
dent" and the frozen condition of the cartons did not pose "an un-
reasonable risk of harm to the longshoreman." 102 Alternatively, the
court ruled that the defendant shipowner's conduct was reasonable
in light of the facts. Finally, the court said that even if the cargo
was loaded improperly, loading was the responsibility of the steve-
doring company and not that of the shipowner. According to the
court, the vessel will not be held responsible for a condition of the
cargo. 103
In Turner,1 0 4 the longshoreman was injured by a cargo condition
98. Id. at 1056.
99. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 101 S. Ct. at 1626.
100. 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981).
101. No. 76-754-C (D. Mass. May 19, 1981).
102. Id. slip op. at 4.
103. Id. slip op. at 6.
104. Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981).
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created by a different stevedore company in a different port where
the cargo was improperly loaded. The cargo of plywood was not
stowed properly, causing part of it to collapse under the plaintiff's
weight. The court found that in this case, based upon evidence of
customary duty, the shipowner had a duty to supervise the loading
operations. The Ninth Circuit, reversing the district court's judg-
ment for the vessel, held that the vessel had a duty to protect the
longshoreman against a concealed danger created by a foreign ste-
vedore, which the vessel could have remedied or warned of if it had
exercised reasonable care.105
The differing results in these two cases are not easily explained.
Both courts applied the negligence standard as set forth in
Scindia. In both cases the dangerous condition was caused by a
stevedoring company in another port, and the shipowner either
knew or should have known of the dangerous condition. The Me-
lanson court's finding that the condition in that case posed no un-
reasonable risk of harm illustrates how critical the facts are when
applying the Scindia standard. A court's conclusion as to what is
unreasonable or what is an obviously improvident decision appears
to be a subjective determination, although a supposedly objective
test of reasonableness is applied.
In Robertson v. Jeffboat, Inc.,1°6 the Sixth Circuit had little diffi-
culty applying the Scindia standard because the facts were rela-
tively simple. The plaintiff drowned when he fell off the barge he
was helping construct because of inadequate lighting and the ab-
sence of safety measures. The court relied on Scindia's holding
that the shipowner owes a duty of care to workers for dangerous
conditions of which it has actual knowledge. In the court's view,
there was no doubt that the shipowner had actual knowledge of
the dangerous condition. The shipowner was also the employer and
knew that the plaintiff would be working in poorly lit and unsafe
conditions on the night of the accident. Therefore, the court held
that the shipowner was liable for negligence.10
Sarauw v. Oceanic Navigation Corp.10 8 presents a more complex
fact situation than Scindia, since the equipment which caused the
injury was owned by the stevedore company. In Sarauw, the long-
shoreman was injured when the gangway, owned by the stevedore
105. Id. at 1304.
106. 651 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1981).
107. Id.
108. 655 F.2d 526 (3d Cir. 1981).
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company, fell to the dock because it was improperly secured. The
Third Circuit found the shipowner liable for failing to exercise rea-
sonable care to secure the gangway and maintain it in a safe condi-
tion. Its holding was premised in part on the belief that the gang-
way, once secured to the ship, actually became a part of the vessel,
because it was the only means by which the crew could embark or
disembark. The court also based its decision on evidence that it
was the shipowner and not the stevedore that maintained control
over the gangway and had a customary duty to inspect it.109
The shipowner denied liability, alleging that its duty had been
modified by contract.110 The court acknowledged that Scindia
stated that the contract between the shipowner and stevedore may
be relevant in determining the duty of the shipowner. The court,
however, rejected the shipowner's argument stating, "[w]e are not
convinced, however, that Scindia instructs that a shipowner may
contract away its duty of care with respect to such an essential
appurtenance of the ship as the gangway." 1 The court also ex-
amined the custom in the industry, another consideration pointed
to in Scindia, and found that although the duty to inspect and
supervise a gangway may be shared with the stevedore by contract,
there was evidence that custom dictates that the duty may not be
transferred completely.1 1 2
In finding the shipowner liable for a defective condition arising
from the stevedore's equipment which was under the active control
of the shipowner, " the Sarauw court went one step beyond
Scindia. The facts in Scindia did not present the Court with an
opportunity to address the question of liability when it is the ste-
vedore's equipment, rather than the shipowner's, which is defec-
tive. The concurring opinion reasoned that the Sarauw holding
was consistent with the policy underlying the Scindia decision, be-
cause the shipowner's liability arises only where the shipowner had
control over a defective condition. The shipowner would not be
held liable for conditions which were solely attributable to the
109. Id. at 528.
110. Id. at 528-29.
111. Id. The court is stating, in effect, that the shipowner has a nondelegable duty in
regard to the gangway. For further discussion of the concept of nondelegable duty, see note
15 infra.
112. Id. at 529.
113. According to the court, "[c]ontrol over the defective condition remains a crucial
factor in imposing liability." Id. at 530.
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stevedore. " "
The court's theory that a shipowner should be held liable even
for equipment it does not own when it assumes and retains control
over that equipment seems correct. The result in this particular
case, however, is disturbing. Most troubling in the court's preclu-
sion of the shipowner's right to contract away its duty of gangway
inspection. Although the conclusion that the duty cannot be con-
tracted away is based on custom, the court appears to beretreating
to the nondelegable duty theory'" and camouflaging its retreat
under the guise of deferring to industry custom.
CONCLUSION
Scindia represents a step towards clarification of the standard of
negligence under section 905(b) of the LHWCA. The decision does
not, however, completely resolve the issue. Although it is clear that
the new standard is reasonable care under the circumstances, what
constitutes reasonable care in every circumstance has not been
clearly delineated. "Inevitably, however, the rule will undergo re-
finement as it is applied to various categories of cases.""' This re-
finement process is appropriate, however, since essentially what
the Court did was to adopt a negligence standard. In negligence
cases, the trier of fact makes the determination of what a reason-
able person would do. Similarly, in longshoremen's actions under
section 905(b) of the LHWCA, the trier of fact should determine
what would be reasonable under the circumstances of each case.
The Supreme Court might assist in the process of refining the
new standard by setting guidelines when it decides cases in partic-
ular areas. Just as in land-based negligence cases there are catego-
ries such as slip and fall and attractive nuisance cases, actions
brought under section 905(b) could be categorized and duties de-
lineated under each category, so that a shipowner would know ex-
actly what its responsibilities are in different situations. Thus, the
Court, when presented with a case dealing with foreign substances
such as oil on the ship's deck or a case involving equipment owned
by the stevedore, could provide analytical models for the lower
114. Id.
115. Under the nondelegable duty theory, the shipowner has certain responsibilities
which it can never delegate. Essentially, it is a form of strict liability or a form of unseawor-
thiness called by another name. Robertson, Negligence Actions by Longshoremen Against
Shipowners Under Section 905(b) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, 3 MAR. LAw. 1, 5 (1977).
116. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 101 S. Ct. at 1620 n. 10.
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courts to follow in determining what is reasonable under specific
types of circumstances. In this way, the Court would develop the
new standard of reasonable care under the circumstances on an
area by area basis.
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